Posted: June 9th, 2015

Disney Case Study Analysis

Disney Case Study Analysis

Paper details:
The instruction and case study article is in the attachment. Please follow the written report detail.
WRITTEN REPORT DETAILS
1. Title Page
2. Table of contents
3. Executive Summary
4. Problem Statement
5. Data Analysis
6. Key Decision Criteria
7. Alternatives Analysis
8. Recommendations
9. Action and Implementation Plan
10. Exhibits
11. References cited – in APA format
It needs to 6 pages double space

ASSIGNMENT TWO CASE STUDY

THE NOT SO WONDERFUL WORLD OF DISNEY
INSTRUCTIONS: First of all, read “The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney* – Things are Better Now at Disneyland Resort Paris”.
The article outlines how Disney currently operates Theme Parks in multiple locations around the world. However, things have not always gone smoothly for Disney in their expansion efforts. Despite this, Disney feels it has learned many valuable lessons about global expansion and is eager to continue growing its worldwide presence. Your task is to advise Disney on this issue. As consultant it is your decision to determine whether or not Disney expands (keeping in mind this is their Strategic goal) and if they do expand, where in the world they should go and what key issues they will need to address in order to be successful.
Follow the Long Cycle Process outlined in the online reading “The Long Cycle Process” whereby you:
1    Define the Issue for Disney
2    Analyse the case data as presented
3    Generate alternatives for Disney
4    Select decision criteria
5    Analyze and evaluate alternatives
6    Select the preferred alternative
7    Develop a brief action/implementation plan.

WRITTEN REPORT DETAILS
1.    Title Page
2.    Table of contents
3.    Executive Summary
4.    Problem Statement
5.    Data Analysis
6.    Key Decision Criteria
7.    Alternatives Analysis
8.    Recommendations
9.    Action and Implementation Plan
10.    Exhibits
11.    References cited – in APA format

GRADING CRITERIA (to include, but not limited to).

Professionally presented; neat, edited, spelling, grammar, organization.
Ability to follow instructions; sections included as instruction (addition information as needed).
Situational analysis relevant and supportive of recommendations.
Statements and arguments concise, clear, understandable and relevant.
Logical information flow.
Evidence of reviewing slate of options before selecting most appropriate.
Recommendations creative and supported by the analysis.
Recommendations are actionable based on research presented.

BONJOUR, MICKEY!
In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visitors.
Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it was
designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that Walt
Disney Company (Disney) had built to date—bigger than Disneyland
in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida;
and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan.
Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to
“go goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between
1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited
Tokyo Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family
of four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend
$600 on a visit to the park. In contrast, at EuroDisney, families were
reluctant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions
of the park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying
overnight was out of the question for many because hotel rooms
were so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380
a night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six
new hotels and one of the biggest in Europe. In comparison, a room
in a top hotel in Paris cost between $340 and $380 a night.
Financial losses became so massive at EuroDisney that the
president had to structure a rescue package to put EuroDisney
back on fi rm fi nancial ground. Many French bankers questioned
the initial fi nancing, but the Disney response was that their views
refl ected the cautious, Old World thinking of Europeans who did
not understand U.S.-style free market fi nancing. After some acrimonious
dealings with French banks, a two-year fi nancial plan was
negotiated. Disney management rapidly revised its marketing plan
and introduced strategic and tactical changes in the hope of “doing
it right” this time.
A Real Estate Dream Come True The Paris location
was chosen over 200 other potential sites stretching from
Portugal through Spain, France, Italy, and into Greece. Spain
thought it had the strongest bid based on its yearlong, temperate,
and sunny Mediterranean climate, but insuffi cient acreage of land
was available for development around Barcelona.
In the end, the French government’s generous incentives,
together with impressive data on regional demographics, swayed
Disney management to choose the Paris location. It was calculated
that some 310 million people in Europe live within two hours’ air
travel of EuroDisney, and 17 million could reach the park within two
hours by car—better demographics than at any other Disney site.
Pessimistic talk about the dismal winter weather of northern France
was countered with references to the success of Tokyo Disneyland,
where resolute visitors brave cold winds and snow to enjoy their
piece of Americana. Furthermore, it was argued, Paris is Europe’s
most-popular city destination among tourists of all nationalities.
Spills and Thrills Disney had projected that the new
theme park would attract 11 million visitors and generate over
$100 million in operating earnings during the fi rst year of operation.
By summer 1994, EuroDisney had lost more than $900 million
since opening. Attendance reached only 9.2 million in 1992,
and visitors spent 12 percent less on purchases than the estimated
$33 per head.
If tourists were not fl ocking to taste the thrills of the new Euro-
Disney, where were they going for their summer vacations in 1992?
Ironically enough, an unforeseen combination of transatlantic airfare
wars and currency movements resulted in a trip to Disneyworld
in Orlando being cheaper than a trip to Paris, with guaranteed good
weather and beautiful Florida beaches within easy reach.
EuroDisney management took steps to rectify immediate problems
in 1992 by cutting rates at two hotels up to 25 percent, introducing
some cheaper meals at restaurants, and launching a Paris
ad blitz that proclaimed “California is only 20 miles from Paris.”
An American Icon One of the most worrying aspects of
EuroDisney’s fi rst year was that French visitors stayed away; they
had been expected to make up 50 percent of the attendance fi gures.
A park services consulting fi rm framed the problem in these
words: “The French see EuroDisney as American imperialism—
plastics at its worst.” The well-known, sentimental Japanese attachment
to Disney characters contrasted starkly with the unexpected
and widespread French scorn for American fairy-tale characters.
French culture has its own lovable cartoon characters such as Astérix,
the helmeted, pint-sized Gallic warrior, who has a theme park
located near EuroDisney.
Hostility among the French people to the whole “Disney idea”
had surfaced early in the planning of the new project. Paris theater
director Ariane Mnouchkine became famous for her description of
EuroDisney as “a cultural Chernobyl.” In fall 1989, during a visit
to Paris, French Communists pelted Michael Eisner with eggs. The
joke going around at the time was, “For EuroDisney to adapt properly
to France, all seven of Snow White’s dwarfs should be named
Grumpy (Grincheux).”
Early advertising by EuroDisney seemed to aggravate local
French sentiment by emphasizing glitz and size rather than
the variety of rides and attractions. Committed to maintaining
Disney’s reputation for quality in everything, more detail was
built into EuroDisney. For example, the centerpiece castle in the
Magic Kingdom had to be bigger and fancier than in the other
parks. Expensive trams were built along a lake to take guests from
the hotels to the park, but visitors preferred walking. Total park
construction costs were estimated at FFr 14 billion ($2.37 billion)
in 1989 but rose by $340 million to FFr 16 billion as a result of all
these add-ons. Hotel construction costs alone rose from an estimated
FFr 3.4 billion to FFr 5.7 billion.
CASE 2?1 The Not-So-Wonderful World of
EuroDisney * —Things Are Better Now at
Disneyland Resort Paris
*The Offi cial name has been changed from “EuroDisney” to “Disneyland Resort Paris.”